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Abstract We study a model of congestible resources, where pricing and scheduling
are intertwined. Motivated by the problem of pricing cloud instances, we model
a cloud computing service as linked GI/GI/· queuing systems where the provider
chooses to offer a fixed pricing service, a dynamic market based service, or a hybrid
of both, where jobs can be preempted in the market-based service. Users (jobs),
who are heterogeneous in both the value they place on service and their cost for
waiting, then choose between the services offered. Combining insights from auction
theory with queuing theory we are able to characterize user equilibrium behavior,
and show its insensitivity to the precise market design mechanism used. We then
provide theoretical and simulation based evidence suggesting that a fixed price
typically, though not always, generates a higher expected revenue than the hybrid
system for the provider.
Keywords Cloud Services · Spot Market · Pricing · Congestion Resources ·
Auctions
1 Introduction
Cloud computing provides on-demand and scalable access to computing resources.
Public clouds, such as Windows Azure and Amazon EC2, treat infrastructure
computing as a service (IaaS) that can be purchased and delivered over the In-
ternet. An agent purchases units of computing time on virtual machines (referred
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2 Vineet Abhishek et al.
to as instances). The most commonly used pricing mechanism for instances is pay
as you go (henceforth, PAYG), where an agent is charged a fixed price per unit
time per instance. However, given stochastic demand, such fixed pricing may re-
sult in unused resources. Rather than letting resources sit idle, the provider could
operate a spot market, selling unused resources at a reduced price via an auction
to agents willing to tolerate delays and interruptions; indeed, Amazon EC2 runs
such a market for Spot Instances. Ben-Yehuda et al. [4] attempt a retrospective
deconstruction of how the Spot Instances are priced.
This paper examines the trade-offs for a provider deciding whether or not to
operate a spot market. On one hand, operating a spot market can create price
discrimination, as agents with low valuations and low waiting costs compete for
spot instances, thereby extracting payments from the agents who would balk if
PAYG were the only option. On the other hand, the spot market provides a cheaper
alternative for agents with high valuations but low waiting cost, causing a loss of
revenue from the agents who would have paid a higher PAYG price if PAYG were
the only option. In consequence, it is not obvious if operating PAYG and the spot
market simultaneously provides any net gain in the expected revenue to the cloud
service provider. Nor is it clear how operating a spot market affects social welfare:
while adding a spot market causes some new agents to be served, some existing
agents that were already being served will now join the spot market, increasing
their waiting costs. Furthermore, if the cloud services provider desires to extract
a given amount of revenue, while maximizing welfare subject to that constraint,
he would set different prices in each system.
To quantify the trade-offs we construct a simple, representative model of a
cloud computing service with agents who are heterogeneous both in their value
for service and in their waiting cost. We first analyze PAYG and a spot market
in isolation and use the resulting insights to analyze what happens when they
operate simultaneously. Our analysis is not tied to any particular pricing rule
for the spot market. Instead, we use a characterization similar to the revenue
equivalence theorem for auctions [18] to characterize the expected payment made
by an agent in any equilibrium of any pricing rule. Moreover, while the analysis of
the queuing system with multiple priority classes and multiple servers is complex
(see, e.g., [10], [13]) an application of the revelation principle [18] allows us to
circumvent this complexity. We describe a general queuing system for the spot
market purely in terms of a waiting time function and exploit its properties for
our analysis. Throughout our paper, by “waiting time”’ we mean the waiting time
in the system or sojourn time.
In summary, we make four contributions in this paper:
(i) We combine insights from auction theory with queuing theory: we model a
cloud computing service as a queuing system described by a waiting time
function, and then apply techniques from the theory of optimal auctions to
analyze it.
(ii) We characterize agent behavior, and show that, in the unique equilibrium,
agents have a waiting cost threshold that determines whether they participate
in the spot market or PAYG. Moreover, their bids in the spot market are
independent of their value for service and increasing in their waiting cost1.
1 Throughout this paper, “increasing” means “strictly increasing.”
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(iii) Using this equilibrium characterization, we provide theoretical and simula-
tion evidence suggesting that operating PAYG in isolation generally, though
not always, provides a higher expected revenue to the cloud service provider
than operating PAYG and a spot market simultaneously. This is under the
assumption that there is no other cost to running a job in the spot market,
e.g. that there is not cost in being preempted.
(iv) We prove that, taking the PAYG price as a real cost (not just a transfer),
agents make efficient decisions about whether to join the spot market; we give
simulation evidence describing the tradeoffs between efficiency in revenue
under each system.
While our results are based on a stylized model of a cloud computing system, we
also discuss how the assumptions of our model can be relaxed and the implications
of our results for the decision Amazon has made to run a spot market.
1.1 Related Work
Our work is at the nexus of queuing theory and game theory. Hassin and Haviv [12]
provide a survey of this area. For observable M/M/1 queues with identical cus-
tomers, Balachandran [6] derives a full information equilibrium. Hassin [11] and
Lui [16] consider unobservable M/M/1 queues where customers with heteroge-
neous waiting costs bid for preemptive priority using the first price auction. They
characterize an equilibrium where bids are increasing in the waiting cost. Afe`che
and Mendelson [2] extend this to more general waiting costs. Dube and Jain [9]
consider a different problem with competing GI/GI/1 priority queues; arriving
jobs decide which queue to join. They find conditions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
Closest to our work are papers that apply the theory of optimal auction design
to optimize pricing and service policies in queuing system. Afe`che [1] and Afe`che
and Pavlin [3] show that delaying jobs or choosing orderings that increase pro-
cessing time can increase revenue. Yahalom et al. [22] generalize [1] by relaxing
the distributional assumptions on valuation and working with convex delay cost.
Katta and Sethuraman [14] design a pricing scheme that, under some assumptions,
is optimal for an M/M/1 queuing system and certain generalizations of it. Cui et
al. [7] consider the problem of jointly managing pricing, scheduling, and admission
control policy for revenue maximization for M/M/1 queues and find solutions for
some special cases. Xu and Li [21] examine possibilities to improve revenue in a
PAYG market through resource throttling. Doroudi et al.[8] study pricing in an
M/G/1 queue for a single class, and a continuum of customers in that class. They
assume that waiting costs are proportional to valuations, which allows customer
types to be unidimensional and hence the theory of optimal (revenue maximizing)
auctions that flowed from Myerson’s seminal work [18] can be applied. They derive
closed form solution for the price functions when the customer values are drawn
from specific types, and compare priority pricing with fixed pricing. While their
results show something similar in spirit to spot pricing raising more revenue than
PAYG, this is driven by an assumption that their PAYG market is oversubscribed
while this is not the case for us.
One issue we do not address is competition among cloud providers, an issue
studied by Anselmi et al. [5].
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Compared to previous work in this literature, the distinguishing aspects of our
work are: (i) we allow for an arbitrary queuing system with multiple servers and
arrival process which need not be memoryless; (ii) our analysis is not tied to a
specific auction mechanism for the spot market; (iii) we allow PAYG and the spot
market to operate simultaneously and are not limited to analyzing a system in
isolation; and (iv) we examine the tradeoff between efficiency and revenue.
2 Model
Consider a cloud computing system where jobs arrive sequentially according to
a stationary stochastic process with independent interarrival times. Each job de-
mands one instance and is associated with a distinct agent; we will use the terms
“agents” and “jobs” interchangeably. The system designs the pricing and schedul-
ing mechanism, with the aim of maximizing revenue, while the jobs aim to maxi-
mize their expected payoff.
The service time for each job is independently drawn according to an arbitrary
distribution with the expected time of 1/µ, where we assume that the exact service
time is unknown to anyone, including the job itself. Jobs differ in their values for
service and their waiting costs. There are n classes of jobs. Each job from class
i has the same value vi for job completion, and we assume vi > vi+1. The total
arrival rate of potential jobs is λ =
∑
i λi. Each job is independently assigned
class i with probability λi/λ, hence the total arrival rate of potential jobs from
class i is λi. Each job from class i incurs a waiting cost per unit time which is an
i.i.d. realization of a random variable Ci with the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) Fi(c), where fi(c) is the corresponding probability density function (pdf) of
Fi(c). The class and exact waiting cost of a job is its private information; however,
the class values vi and probability distributions Fi are common knowledge. The
random variable Ci’s are independent of each other.
Jobs (agents) choose whether or not to enter the system, are Individually Ra-
tional and risk neutral with respect to payments and benefits and hence aim to
maximize their expected payoff. If a job from class i with waiting cost c pays an
amount m for using the instance and spends the total time w in the system (the
sum of the queuing time and the service time, referred to as the waiting time),
then the full price to the job is the sum of the direct payment and indirect waiting
costs, cw +m, and then hence its payoff is vi − cw −m. Jobs compete for system
resources by submitting a “bid” to the system, where the information contained
in the bid will depend on the mechanism design, and is some function of the job’s
value, vi and waiting cost ci.
Under our Individually Rational assumption, each job competes to acquire an
instance only if its expected payoff is nonnegative. Hence, fi(c) is assumed to be
strictly positive2 for c ∈ [0, µvi], (since jobs from class i with waiting cost greater
than µvi will always balk).
Two pricing and scheduling regimes are allowed, shown schematically in Figure
1 and which we now describe.
Modeling PAYG: We assume that the overall system has enough capacity to
serve the exogenous demand λ/µ with negligible buffering or rejection of individual
2 This is not a restrictive assumption in practice since we can approximate any distribution
arbitrarily well with such a distribution. See, e.g., Figures 3 and 4 and associated discussion
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Fig. 1 System model for PAYG and spot market
.
jobs, and hence PAYG is modeled as a GI/GI/∞ system with service rate µ (this
is discussed further in Section 7.1). A job arriving to PAYG joins immediately and
is served until completion. Each job is charged a price p > 0 per unit time for
using a PAYG instance. The price p is common knowledge. The only information
contained in a “bid” from a job is a request to enter. The expected payoff of
a job from class i with the waiting cost c from using a PAYG instance is thus
vi − (c+ p)/µ. If c > µvi − p, the job does not participate in PAYG.
Modeling the spot market: The spot market is modeled as a GI/GI/k system
with preemption where jobs bid for priority, where a bid can be thought of (but
does not have to be) a single number that represents a willingness to pay. We
will be working with auctions where a job with a higher bid is given priority over
a job with a lower bid and can preempt the lowest priority job under service if
needed; Section 4.1 provides further details on the assumptions we make on the
relationship between bids and priorities. A job which is preempted goes back to the
queue and waits to resume from the point it left. The queue state is unobservable
to the arriving jobs. Jobs are not allowed to renege or change their bids. A job is
charged based its own bid and the bids of others according to some spot pricing
mechanism. Examples include the first price auction where at each time the jobs
with k highest bids currently in the system are served and each pays its bid, and the
(k+ 1)th price auction where the jobs with k highest bids are served and each job
pays the current (k + 1)th highest bid per-unit time. We do not explicitly assume
any specific spot pricing mechanism and abstract away from it by considering the
expected payment by a job in a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (henceforth, BNE) using
the revenue equivalence theorem for auctions [18]. A consequence is that only the
expected payment matters, and hence any payment implementation that achieves
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the correct payments can be used. In practice, charging via a per-unit time price
is a natural implementation.
3 Mechanism Design
We now recap certain fundamental concepts from mechanism design, which we
make use of in our analysis, and which may be unfamiliar to the queueing systems
community.
Mechanism design is a branch of game theory that describes rules governing
the allowed interactions of agents. Given some allowed set of bids or reports from
the buyers, which will depend on their underlying “true” reports or values, a mech-
anism prescribes both an allocation rule (who should get what) and a payment
rule, how much they should pay, where the allocation and payment rules are func-
tions of the submitted bids. A standard notion of a stable solution relevant to this
setting is that of a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (henceforth BNE). In a BNE there is
a prior distribution over the values of other agents and the strategy adopted by
each agent is optimal in expectation given this prior, his value, and the strategies
other agents of each type would adopt.
The revelation principle, states that if there is a BNE for some mechanism,
then an equivalent direct truthful mechanism exists, one where it is an equilibrium
for the the buyers to bid their true values, equivalent in the sense of outcomes
(allocation and payments). This result, proved by Myerson [19], makes it sufficient
to focus on truthful, direct mechanisms.
How to choose amongst competing (truthful direct) mechanisms? In a seminal
work, Myerson [18] showed that for mechanisms that are truthful or incentive
compatible in the BNE sense, then first, the allocation rule leads to one and only
one payment rule, and secondly that the payoff formula bounds the payoff of
any feasible mechanism. The first result is a Revenue Equivalence result: different
mechanisms which lead to the same allocation rule provide the same revenue; the
second allows the design of optimal mechanisms, where revenue is maximized. In
this paper, we use these techniques to characterize the equilibrium outcome once
a PAYG price has been fixed.
One notable truthful mechanism is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or VCG mech-
anism, which has the property that it is efficient, i.e. maximizes social welfare
(see, for example [15] for a description of VCG). It also has the property that the
payment rule for an agent depends on the bids of other agents and represents the
externality that agent imposes by being part of the system. For example, if k iden-
tical goods are being sold, then the VCG mechanism is the Vickrey auction [20]
that allocates the k items to the highest k bidders, and an agent wining pays the
k + 1st highest bid (i.e. the first losing bid). In this paper, we make use of this
characterization of the VCG mechanism when analyzing the social welfare created
by a hybrid market in Section 6.
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4 PAYG and Spot Market Analysis
4.1 Strategy, waiting time, and spot pricing
When a spot market is operating, either alone or in conjunction with PAYG, a job
that decides to join it participates in an auction and must decide how to bid based
on the payment rules of the auction. The optimal bid may depend in a complicated
way on its private information (value for service and cost of waiting). As a result,
previous work has typically focused on analyzing a particular mechanism such
as a first price auction. However, we show in this section that this complexity
is dispensable. Regardless of the auction mechanism, jobs that enter the spot
market with higher waiting costs pay more and wait less time and these values
are (essentially) independent of the job’s class. The job’s class does matter in
determining whether a job participates in the spot market, but this takes the form
of a simple cutoff: jobs with waiting costs below the cutoff participate and those
above do not.
By the revelation principle for BNE [19], it suffices to restrict our considera-
tion to truthful direct revelation mechanisms: mechanisms where jobs report their
private information and it is an equilibrium for them to do so truthfully. Any im-
plementable outcome is implementable by such a mechanism. Thus, a job reports
a type (v, c) and if it participates in the spot market has an expected waiting
time w˜(v, c) and expected payment m˜(v, c). In principle, these could depend on
the value v of the job’s class, however, we show that it is essentially without loss
to assume they do not.
Lemma 1 For all truthful direct revelation mechanisms for the spot market and all
equilibria there exists an equilibrium with the same expected utility where expected wait-
ing time and payments are independent of class for all values of c where multiple classes
participate in the spot market.
Proof A job of class i with waiting cost c that participates in the spot market
chooses a report (v′, c′) minimizing the expected total cost cw˜(v′, c′) + m˜(v′, c′).
Thus, when multiple classes participate, the set of optimal reports is class-independent;
in particular, if classes i and j participate, both (vi, c) and (vj , c) belong to the
set of optimal reports. Let si(c) be the (randomized) equilibrium strategy for class
i with cost c. Now, suppose instead that every job from a class that participates
with positive probability with waiting cost c uses strategy si(c) with probability
λifi(c)/(
∑
j∈SPOT (c) λjfj(c)) where SPOT (c) is the set of all classes that partic-
ipate in the spot market with positive probability with cost c. Then the arrival
process for all strategies si(c) remains identical to the original process. That is,
the probability that the next job to arrive reports a pair (v, c) is unchanged. Hence
the waiting time and the expected payment remain unchanged. This new class-
independent randomized strategy is also an equilibrium for all classes. uunionsq
Since jobs can undo any tie-breaking a class-based mechanism does, we assume
for the remainder of the paper that mechanisms have a class-independent expected
waiting time w˜(c) and expected payment m˜(c). This allows us to concentrate on
one-dimensional reports (bids) from the agents, related to their waiting cost. We
now show that jobs with higher waiting costs pay more and spend less time waiting.
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Lemma 2 In (the truthful) equilibrium, w˜(c) is nonincreasing in c and m˜(c) is non-
decreasing in c for values of c that participate in the spot market for some class.
Proof Consider ĉ > c. The optimality of truthful reporting implies:
ĉw˜(ĉ) + m˜(ĉ) ≤ ĉw˜(c) + m˜(c), (1)
cw˜(c) + m˜(c) ≤ cw˜(ĉ) + m˜(ĉ). (2)
Adding (1) and (2) implies w˜(ĉ) ≤ w˜(c). Using this and (2), we get m˜(ĉ) ≥ m˜(c).
uunionsq
Thus far, our assumptions have been without loss of generality. We now make
two assumptions that are not.
Assumption 1 We assume that jobs with no waiting cost are served for free in the
spot market, hence m˜(0) = 0.
We revisit this assumption at the end of the paper.
Assumption 2 We assume that, in equilibrium in the spot market, jobs with higher
waiting costs always have strictly higher priority than jobs with lower waiting costs.
Note that this assumption is a stronger condition than assuming that w˜(c) is
decreasing. Since w˜ is the expected waiting time, if priorities are assigned randomly
it is possible to have a strictly lower expected waiting time but in some cases a
lower priority. All mechanisms that assign a strictly higher priority to the jobs
with higher bids in the spot market, admit an equilibrium where the spot market
bids are increasing in the waiting cost, and have no reserve price satisfy these
restrictions.
We now characterize the participation decision facing jobs.
Lemma 3 For each class i there is a cutoff ci below which jobs participate in the spot
market and above which they do not.
Proof A job participates in the spot market if the payoff is better than its alterna-
tive (0 if the spot market is operated in isolation or max{0, vi−(p+c)/µ} if PAYG
with price p is available). The payoff from participation is vi − cw˜(c) − m˜(c). Let
c be any class that participates. Taking the case of the spot market in isolation
first, if vi− cw˜(c)− m˜(c) ≥ 0 then vi− ĉw˜(c)− m˜(c) > 0 for all ĉ < c. Thus, if a job
of class i with cost c participates all lower cost jobs do as well. This argument also
implies that if a job with waiting cost c does not participate, then neither does
any job with waiting cost ĉ > c . Thus, there is some threshold ci below which
jobs participate and above which they do not. The argument with PAYG as an
option is essentially the same because the minimum possible value of w˜(c) is 1/µ,
the same as the waiting time under PAYG. uunionsq
In order to characterize an equilibrium where jobs use cutoffs c = (c1, .., cn),
we need to analyze the expected waiting time for a job with waiting cost c in
the spot market with cutoffs c. It suffices to characterize some properties of the
waiting times for arbitrary choices of cutoffs. Given a queuing system for the spot
market, define the waiting time function w(c; c) as the expected waiting time of
a job with cost c when jobs of class i use cutoff ci. Note that we are defining w
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for arbitrary cutoffs, not just equilibrium ones. We define (c′i, c−i) to be the vector
obtained from c by replacing the ith component by c′i.
The following lemma gives the relevant properties of w. Intuitively, they capture
that jobs with higher waiting costs get lower waiting times, if more jobs decide to
enter the spot market then waiting times increase, and that entering jobs do not
affect the waiting time of jobs with higher waiting costs.
Lemma 4 The waiting-time function w(c; c) is well defined whenever
(
∑
i λiFi(ci))/(kµ) < 1. It is an increasing function of
∑
i λi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+. In
particular, this implies:
(i) w(c; c) is decreasing in c for c ∈ [0,maxi ci], w(c; c) > 1/µ if c < maxi ci, and
w(c; c) = 1/µ if c ≥ maxi ci.
(ii) w(c; c) is increasing in ci for ci ∈ [0, µvi].
(iii) For any t ≥ ĉj > cj
w(t; c) = w(t; (ĉj , c−j)).
Proof The condition (
∑
i λiFi(ci))/(kµ) < 1 ensures the queue is stable and hence
expected waiting time is finite. Since priority is given to jobs with higher waiting
cost, the expected waiting time of a job with waiting cost c increases with the
total arrival rate of the jobs whose waiting cost is higher than c, which is equal to∑
i λi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+. The job with waiting cost greater than or equal to maxi ci
gets the highest priority and is served immediately with no interruptions. The
enumerated properties follow easily. uunionsq
Next, we use a characterization similar to the revenue equivalence theorem for
auctions [18] to show that the expected payment by any job with waiting cost c is
uniquely determined by the waiting time function w; in particular, it is the same
for any spot pricing mechanism.
Suppose that truthful reporting with cutoffs c constitutes a BNE for the given
spot pricing mechanism. Let m(c) be the expected payment made by a job with
waiting cost c (which is independent of its class). For a BNE to exist, the following
incentive compatibility (henceforth, IC) constraint must hold: for all ĉ, c ≤ maxi ci,
and any i,
vi − cw(c; c)−m(c) ≥ vi − cw(ĉ; c)−m(ĉ). (3)
By analogy with [18], the next lemma relates the expected payment with the
waiting time function w and shows that the properties of the waiting time function
along with the expected payment given by (4) ensure that the IC constraint (3) is
satisfied.
Lemma 5 A necessary condition for (3) to hold is:
m(c) =
∫ c
0
w(t; c)dt− cw(c; c). (4)
Hence, the expected payment by a job with waiting cost c is uniquely determined by the
function w. Moreover, Lemma 4 and (4) together satisfy the IC constraint (3).
Proof (Sketch- following Myerson[18]) Let
pi(ĉ, c) , vi − cw(ĉ; c)−m(ĉ).
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Then for the IC constraint to hold, the maximum of maxĉ pi(ĉ, c) must be achieved,
and is achieved at ĉ = c. Since pi as a function of c is affine, it follows that
pi(c, c) = maxĉ pi(ĉ, c) is convex, and hence is differentiable almost everywhere,
with (right) derivative:
∂
∂c
pi(c, c) = −w(c; c). (5)
Integrating between 0 and c, substituting for pi and rearranging give the result
under our assumption that m(0) = 0 (the job with zero waiting cost won’t pay
anything in the spot market because waiting is costless for it). uunionsq
Since w(c; c) is decreasing in c for c ∈ [0,maxi ci], the proof of Lemma 2 can
be used to establish a stronger monotonicity result for the expected payment m.
Lemma 6 Given cutoffs c, the expected payment m(c) is increasing in c for c ∈
[0,maxi ci].
Proof Suppose that the waiting cost of a job in class i is c and it instead misreports
some ĉ 6= c. The expected payoff under truthful reporting is pi(c, c) , vi−cw(c; c)−
m(c) and the expected payoff in case of misreport is pi(ĉ, c) , vi − cw(ĉ; c)−m(ĉ).
Considering the cases ĉ < c and ĉ > c separately, using the property that w(t; c) is
decreasing in t, and using (4), we can show that pi(c, c)− pi(ĉ, c) > 0. uunionsq
4.2 Revenue and equilibria for isolated markets
Next, we analyze PAYG and the spot market each in isolation.
4.2.1 PAYG
First consider PAYG in isolation. If the PAYG price is p, a job from class i with
waiting cost c obtains an expected payoff vi− (p+ c)/µ by using a PAYG instance.
A job will participate in PAYG if this payoff is nonnegative. Thus, a job from class
i participates in PAYG if its waiting cost c ≤ µvi − p. The effective arrival rate of
class i jobs is then λiFi(µvi − p) where Fi(µvi − p) = 0 if p ≥ µvi. Each such job
uses a PAYG instance for an expected duration of 1/µ and pays p per unit time.
Hence, the expected revenue to the cloud service provider per unit time, denoted
by RPAY G(p), is:
RPAY G(p) , p
µ
(∑
i
λiFi(µvi − p)
)
, (6)
and the optimum revenue is maxpR
PAY G(p).
4.2.2 Spot Market in Isolation
For the spot market in isolation, denote the cutoffs in this case by cS . From (4), the
expected payoff of a job from class i with waiting cost c is vi−
∫ c
0
w(t; cS)dt. A job
will participate in the spot market as long as its expected payoff is nonnegative.
Hence, the cutoff vector cS must satisfy:
vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; cS)dt
{≥ 0 if c < cSi ,
= 0 if c = cSi .
(7)
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Theorem 1 below shows that there is an unique cutoff vector cS satisfying (7)
which characterizes the BNE for the spot market in isolation.
Theorem 1 The following holds:
(i) There is a unique solution cS to the following system of equations in x = (x1, . . . , xn):∫ xi
0
w(t; x)dt = vi. (8)
(ii) In all BNE, a job from class i with waiting cost c participates in the spot market
if and only if c ≤ cSi .
The proof follows by straightforward inductive argument on the number of
agent classes, and is given in Appendix A. To highlight the explicit dependence of
the expected payment on the cutoffs vector cS , we use m(c; cS); i.e,
m(c; cS) =
∫ c
0
w(t; cS)dt− cw(c; cS). (9)
Using Theorem 1, the expected revenue to the cloud service provider per unit time
when the spot market is operated in isolation, denoted by Rs, is:
Rs ,
∑
i
λi
∫ cSi
0
m(t; cS)fi(t)dt. (10)
4.3 Revenue and equilibria in the hybrid market
We now leverage the insights gained from analyzing PAYG and the spot market
each in isolation and move to analyzing the hybrid system where both are operated
simultaneously. As mentioned in Section 4.1, for a given PAYG price p, we look
for a cutoff vector c(p) such that a job from class i with waiting cost c joins the
spot market if and only if c < ci(p), and if so, it reports its waiting cost truthfully;
otherwise it joins PAYG as long as c ≤ µvi − p (the cutoff for class i if PAYG is
operating in isolation).
A job from class i with waiting cost c gets the expected payoff vi−
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt
from using a spot instance and reporting its waiting cost truthfully, while its
expected payoff from using a PAYG instance is vi − (p+ c)/µ. It will pick the one
which offers a higher expected payoff. If the PAYG price is too high for a class,
then no jobs from that class go to PAYG. Theorem 2 below finds the unique cutoff
vector c(p) and uses it to characterizes the BNE of the hybrid system. The proof
proceeds along the same lines as that of Theorem 1 and is given in Appendix B.
We also derive additional cutoff parameters c¯ which we require for analyzing the
hybrid market, and which are useful as starting points for determining the optimal
cS .
Theorem 2 The following holds:
(i) For each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} there is a unique vector of the form
x = (xi, xi, . . . , xi, xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xn)
that satisfies
∫ xj
0
w(t; x)dt = vj for all j ≥ i. Let ci be the value of xi in this
vector.
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(ii) Define vn+1 = cn+1 = c0 = 0 and v0 = ∞. Then there is a unique i ∈
{0, 1, ..., n}, denoted i∗ that is the class such that p ∈ [µvi∗+1− ci∗+1, µvi− ci∗).
(iii) There is a unique solution c(p) to the system of equations that∫ xj
0
w(t; x)dt =
{
p+xj
µ if j ≤ i∗
vj otherwise.
(11)
(iv) In any BNE, a job from class i with waiting cost c participates in the spot market
if and only if c < ci(p), it participates in PAYG if ci(p) ≤ c ≤ µvi − p. If
µvi − p < ci(p) then no class i job participates in PAYG3. In particular, this is
true exactly for the classes such that i > i∗.
This theorem also provides insight into the structure of the outcome. For ex-
ample, if follows from parts (ii), (iii) and (iv) that
Corollary 1 All classes that participate in PAYG have the same cutoff, ci∗(p), and if
the price is set higher than µv1 − c1 = µv1 − cS1 then no class participates in PAYG
and the outcome is the same as if only the spot market existed.
Our analysis characterizes a truthful BNE for the system where PAYG and the
spot market are operating simultaneously. This equilibrium can be implemented
by assigning higher priority to the jobs with the higher waiting cost and collecting
the payment according to (4).
The expected revenue to the cloud service provider per unit time is the sum of
expected revenue from the spot market and PAYG. From (6), (10), and Theorem
2, given a PAYG price p, the expected revenue per unit time for the hybrid system,
denoted by RH(p), is:
RH(p) ,
∑
i
λi
(
p
µ
[Fi(µvi − p)− Fi(ci(p))]+ +
∫ ci(p)
0
m(t; c(p))fi(t)dt
)
, (12)
and the optimum revenue is maxpR
H(p).
5 Revenue Comparisons
In the previous section, we characterized the equilibrium outcomes and result-
ing revenue for three different market types. Now we compare their performance.
Since just having a spot market is a special case of the hybrid market, we focus on
whether a cloud service provider should prefer PAYG or a hybrid market. Perhaps
the simplest question we can ask is whether PAYG or hybrid raises more revenue.
The next theorem shows that if the optimal price for the hybrid system is suf-
ficiently small, PAYG in isolation can provide a higher expected revenue to the
cloud service provider than operating PAYG and the spot market simultaneously.
Theorem 3 Suppose the optimal price pH of the hybrid system is such that pH ≤
µvn − cn, i.e., all classes participate in PAYG. Then the optimum expected revenue
per unit time from PAYG in isolation is higher than the optimum expected revenue per
unit time from the hybrid system; i.e., maxpR
H(p) = RH(pH) < maxpR
PAY G(p).
3 It is assumed that jobs break ties between the spot market and PAYG in favor of PAYG.
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Proof Since maxpR
PAY G(p) ≥ RPAY G(pH), it suffices to show that RPAY G(pH) >
RH(pH).
Since pH ≤ µvn − cn, then for all i and j, ci(pH) = cj(pH) ≤ cn, implying
µvi − pH ≥ cn ≥ ci(p). Then from (6) and (12),
RPAY G(pH)−RH(pH) =
∑
i
λi
(
pH
µ
Fi(ci(p
H))−
∫ ci(pH)
0
m(t; c(pH))fi(t)dt
)
.
(13)
At c = ci(p
H), a job is indifferent between PAYG and the spot market. Hence,
ci(p
H)w(ci(p
H); c(pH)) +m(ci(p
H); c(pH)) =
ci(p
H) + pH
µ
. (14)
Since ci(p
H) = cj(p
H), w(ci(p
H); c(pH)) = 1/µ. Hence,
m(ci(p
H); c(pH)) = pH/µ. From Lemma 6, m(t; c(pH)) is increasing in t for t ∈
[0, ci(p)]. This and (13) imply:
RPAY G(pH)−RH(pH) > ∑
i
λi
(
pH
µ
Fi(ci(p
H))−
∫ ci(p)
0
pH
µ
fi(t)dt
)
= 0. (15)
uunionsq
The intuition behind Theorem 3 is that, in a class that participates in PAYG,
all jobs of that class that instead choose the spot market would prefer PAYG
to balking. Since they pay less money (but more waiting time) to use the spot
market, we could make more money if we could prevent them from entering the
spot market. When this is true of every class, we can actually prevent them, by
simply eliminating the spot market.
Obviously Theorem 3 has significantly more bite with a small number of classes,
since it requires that all participate in PAYG. However, we note that for Amazon
only a small percentage of jobs are submitted to the spot market, so this may
well be the relevant case. Further, we conjecture that the revenue ranking result
holds much more broadly. As an example, we simulate the performance of a spot
market that consists of k parallel M/M/1 queues with two classes, where jobs bid
for preemptive priorities. An arriving job is randomly and uniformly sent to one
of the k queues where it is served according to its priority order, determined by
its bid, in that queue. As shown in prior work [16], the waiting time is given by
w(c; c1, c2) =
1
µ
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
ρi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+
)2 , (16)
where ρi , λi/(kµ). The proof of Theorem 2 provides a recipe for numerically
computing the cutoff vector c(p) as a function of PAYG price p.
We randomly generated one hundred random configurations of the values of
vi’s, λi’s, and k. All were chosen uniformly at random from [0, 20], with k a random
integer from this range. The service rate µ was kept constant at one and Fi was
uniform in the interval [0, µvi].
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Fig. 2 Expected revenue RPAYG(p), RH(p), RS(p) for PAYG, Hybrid and Spot respectively
as a function of PAYG price p for fixed λ1 ≈ 0.76, λ2 ≈ 1.23, v1 ≈ 10.5, v2 ≈ 1.88 with k = 1
and uniform waitings cost distributions.
For each realized configuration, we observed that the optimal revenue from
PAYG in isolation was always higher than the optimal revenue from the hybrid
system where PAYG and the spot market are operating simultaneously, even for
the case where the optimal price pH of the hybrid system is greater than µv2− c2.
An example plot where pH > µv2 − c2 is shown in Figure 24. Observe that if
PAYG price is low, most of the jobs in the hybrid system use PAYG and pay a
small price, leading to a small expected revenue. As PAYG price increases, jobs
move to the spot market, reaching a point where all jobs use the spot market.
At p = µv2, all class 2 jobs balk from PAYG leading to a kink in the plot for
PAYG in isolation. However, it is not the case that PAYG raises more revenue
at all prices p, as near this kink the hybrid market raises slightly more revenue.
Additional simulations with exponential and beta distributed waiting costs also
failed to generate instances where the hybrid market generated more revenue.
This suggest that for a broad range of parameters not operating a spot market is
optimal.
We now explore a situation where intuitively a hybrid scheme should outper-
form PAYG, specifically where there are two types of jobs: high value jobs with
high waiting time costs, and low value jobs having low waiting time costs. A hybrid
mechanism where high value jobs use PAYG, and low value use the spot market
might be expected to generate more revenue than setting a single PAYG price. We
shall see that this is still often not the case, essentially for two reasons:
1. In any hybrid scheme, if the price is such that only the high class participates in
PAYG (i∗ = 1) some high value traffic will always use the Spot Market. This is
because it follows from (11) in Theorem 2 that c1(p) > 0, hence F1(c1(p)) > 0.
4 The exact parameter values are v1 = 10.508088077186715, v2 = 1.876400535497311, λ1 =
0.7576345977040905, λ2 = 1.2301997305619036, and k = 1.
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2. Under the same setting, not all the low value traffic can use the spot market:
by the proof of Lemma 7 in the appendix c2(p) is decreasing in p in this range.
Thus c2(p) < v2, and hence F2(c2(p)) < 1.
In other words we cannot achieve perfect separation of the two classes by price
alone. We use Beta distributions to examine this example in more detail. Consider
a setting where there is one type with high value (v1 = 10) and high waiting costs
while another with low value v2 and low waiting costs. Figure 3 shows such an
example where the waiting cost for the low value type is essentially all between 0
and 1 and the waiting costs for the high value type are essentially all slightly less
than 5. The other parameters are k = 10 and λ1 = λ2 = 5. We now explore what
happens as we vary v2 between 3 and 4, settings where the optimal PAYG price
excludes type 2 traffic, and hence Theorem 3 does not apply. Intuitively, we could
set a PAYG price close to 5 to try and capture as much revenue from the high
values as possible while getting some revenue from the low values. Figure 4 shows
that when v2 = 3 even in this setting PAYG alone is still optimal (though only
very slightly). The essential problem is that the high PAYG price gives class 1
jobs an incentive to drop down into the spot market, wiping out some of the gains
from serving the class 2 jobs. It does suggest that the hybrid system can be more
robust in some cases if there is uncertainty about how best to set prices. However,
this is an example created to make the hybrid system look as good as possible;
in Figure 2, which is much more representative of the examples generated in our
simulations, the hybrid system does not add such robustness.
If we increase v2, putting v2 = 3.5, then as shown in Figure 5, the hybrid
market does indeed generate (slightly) more revenue that PAYG. But if v2 is
increased still further to v2 = 4, then once again PAYG generates more revenue.
For this parameterized model, the hybrid model is only better if approximately
3.1 ≤ v2 ≤ 3.8, whereas PAYG generates more revenue if approximately v2 ≤ 3 or
v2 ≥ 3.9. Similarly, if we fix all parameters except λ2, there is a small interval I,
when hybrid is optimal for λ2 ∈ I, and PAYG optimal for all other λ2. Thus, even
in an example designed to make the hybrid mechanism look as good as possible,
there is a relatively small range of parameters where it is superior.
6 Welfare Analysis
The two systems also provide different social welfare (i.e. the value of served jobs
minus their waiting costs). For classes that participate in both PAYG and spot,
agents that send their job to the spot market incur a higher waiting cost, which
reduces welfare. On the other hand, classes that do not participate in PAYG receive
some service in a spot market, which increases welfare. If the service provider
wishes to raise a given amount of revenue, Figure 2 shows that he would pick a
different (lower) price, which increases welfare.
To help characterize social welfare, we now show that the outcome of the hybrid
system is, in a sense, efficient. Economic efficiency is the property of maximizing
social welfare, the total utility in the system. Since payments are just a transfer
of utility from one agent (the job) to another (the owner of the system), they are
irrelevant. It has previously been observed for restricted cases that spot market
outcomes are efficient (e.g. [11]). We show that this is true in general, but only
if we treat the PAYG price as a real cost. Hence we say that the outcome is
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Fig. 3 Exanple pdfs fi(c) of well-separated waiting costs.
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Fig. 4 Expected revenue RPAYG(p), RH(p), RS(p) for PAYG, Hybrid and Spot respectively
as a function of PAYG price p for fixed λ1 = λ2 = 5, k = 10, v1 = 10 and v2 = 3. Here PAYG
is (just) optimal. Waiting cost pdfs fi(c) as in Figure 3.
pseudo-efficient, because it would be efficient if the PAYG price represented a real
cost.
Theorem 4 The equilibrium of the hybrid system is pseudo-efficient: given the PAYG
price p, agents make the socially optimal decision in determining whether to send their
job to the spot market, send it to PAYG, or balk. Equivalently, this mechanism imple-
ments the VCG outcome. Thus, the payment of an agent is his (expected) externality
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Fig. 5 Expected revenue RPAYG(p), RH(p), RS(p) for PAYG, Hybrid and Spot respectively
as a function of PAYG price p for fixed λ1 = λ2 = 5 , k = 10, v1 = 10, as in Figure 4, but
with v2 = 3.5. Now the Hybrid scheme is optimal.
Proof Suppose we use the VCG mechanism, which selects the pseudo-efficient out-
come and charges each agent his externality. In this outcome a given class of job
must have all jobs with waiting costs below a cutoff sent to the spot market. Oth-
erwise, jobs with a lower waiting cost that are not sent to it could be swapped with
jobs with a higher waiting cost, increasing social welfare. Consider the marginal
effect of admitting a job at the cutoff to the spot market for any class. Since the
outcome is pseudo-efficient, the externality this causes plus its own waiting cost
must be equal either to the cost it would experience under PAYG (if it would oth-
erwise go there) or to its value (if it would otherwise balk). Since VCG is incentive
compatible, we know that its payment (equal to the externality) satisfies (4). But
then the equations that define the cutoffs of the spot market are exactly the same
as those from (11), whose unique solution is the outcome of the hybrid system. uunionsq
Given a PAYG price p, the expected social welfare per unit time for the hybrid
system, denoted by WH(p), is:
WH(p) ,
∑
i
λi
(∫ µvi−p
ci(p)
(
vi − t
µ
)
fi(t)dt+
∫ ci(p)
0
(vi − w(t; c(p)) fi(t)dt
)
. (17)
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of prices on social welfare in the same example
from Figure 2. For much of the range of prices, the welfares of PAYG and the
hybrid sytem are similar, with the better solution changing several times. Once
prices are high enough that no one participates in PAYG in the hybrid system,
social welfare in the hybrid system is higher; because PAYG tends to extract
more revenue at a given price, Figure 7 shows that, at least in this example,
PAYG enables a better tradeoff interesting most operating points. In particular,
while there are choices of social welfare for which the hybrid market raises more
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Fig. 6 Social welfare WPAYG(p),WS(p),WH(p) as a function of PAYG price for Figure 2
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Fig. 7 Tradeoff between revenue R(p) and welfare W (p) for Figure 2 parameter settings.
revenue, for every such choice there is a choice with higher social welfare where the
hybrid market simultaneously achieves more revenue (i.e. a Pareto improvement in
economic terminology). So in this example, PAYG not only raises more revenue but
enables better tradeoffs between revenue and social welfare. Gaining a theoretical
understanding of these tradeoffs is an important question for future work.
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7 Relaxing Model Assumptions
We now consider extensions to our model, which relax some of our assumptions.
7.1 Finite Capacity PAYG
We have modeled PAYG as infinite capacity system, whereas the spot market is
has a finite capacity (k) servers. This dichotomy is intended to represent current
cloud-computing markets, where IaaS is primarily sold using a PAYG model with
availability guarantees, whereas the spot market is much smaller. However, we
believe that with respect to our results, the assumption that PAYG is modeled as
a GI/GI/∞ queue, rather than (say) a GI/GI/n/n queue is essentially without
loss of generality.
If PAYG has a finite capacity, then in order to give service level guarantees,
there is some arrival rate λ∗ and associated load ρ∗ such that the performance
of PAYG meets service level guarantees for all λ ≤ λ∗. For example, by choosing
λ∗ such that Pr{arriving jobs sees all n servers busy|λ = λ∗} ≤ , for some small
 ≈ 0. Provided λ ≤ λ∗, the behavior of the PAYG queue will approximated by
GI/GI/∞ queue. For λ > λ∗, with a finite capacity queue, certain jobs would
not be admitted (c.f [4] for some information on Amazon EC2 PAYG policies).
Thus, we could incorporate this in our model by assuming that there is a small
probability that jobs submitted to PAYG are not served and pay cost 0. This
slightly reduces revenue from PAYG and the PAYG part of hybrid and results
in classes choosing slightly higher cutoffs in Theorem 2, but does not materially
affect our results.
In more detail, let B(ρ, n) denote the probability that an arriving job sees
all servers busy in an GI/GI/n/n queue, which serves PAYG customers. Define
ρPAY G(p) = 1µ
∑
i λiFi(µvi − p), and let  = B(ρPAY G(p), n). Then Theorem 2
holds as stated, but with the BNE in part (iv) replaced by ∗-BNE, where ∗
is upper bounded by vi(1 − p/µ) × . Compared to n = ∞, RPAY G(p) decreases
by pρPAY G(p)×B(ρPAY G(p), n), while RH(p) decreases by pρH(p)×B(ρH(p), n),
where ρS(p) , 1µ
∑
i λiFi(ci(p)), ρ
H(p) = ρPAY G(p)− ρS(p); both decrements are
O() under our assumptions that ρs  ρPAY G.
Alternatively Theorem 2 can be amended to allow BNE rather than ∗-BNE
on replacing (11) with
∫ xj
0
w(t; x)dt =
{
p+xj
µ (1−B(ρH(p), N) + vjB(ρH(p), N) if j ≥ i
vj otherwise,
and using this to define the unique c(p) and ci∗ via (ii). The finite capacity results
in an O() increase in the cut-offs. Notice that now there is weak O() dependence
of the cut-offs on the class, and hence payments also will have this weak class
dependence. However, these do not affect our results that in general PAYG raises
more revenue.
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7.2 Reserve Prices
In our basic model, we assumed that m(0) = 0. This means that there is no
minimum payment (reserve price), so jobs willing to tolerate a long enough wait can
be served for free. Imposing such a reserve price is typically a way to raise revenue,
so intuitively adding them to the spot market seems beneficial and potentially a
way to make the hybrid market more profitable than PAYG alone. Indeed, it is at
least weakly better because a PAYG is the special case of a hybrid market with a
reserve price equal to the PAYG price. In this section, we explain why this extra
option need not actually help.
First, we explain how our characterizations from Theorems 1 and 2 change in
the presence of reserve prices. If we institute a reserve price of m(0) = r, then the
incentive compatibility constraint given by Lemma 5 becomes
m(c) = r +
∫ c
0
w(t; c)dt− cw(c; c).
With this change, we need to change the systems of equations based on indifference
between the spot market and PAYG or balking. Specifically, (8) becomes∫ xi
0
w(t; x)dt = vi − r,
while (11) becomes ∫ xj
0
w(t; x)dt =
{
p+xj
µ − r if j ≥ i
vj − r otherwise.
The same proofs go through, mutatis mutandis.
This new characterization, shows that adding a reserve price doesn’t change
anything significant about the behavior or jobs. The spot market is now expensive,
so fewer jobs use it with the rest either choosing PAYG or balking, but this struc-
ture is still determined by cutoffs as before. Thus it is still the case that, for every
class with jobs that participate in both PAYG and the spot market, all those jobs
would have been willing to pay the higher PAYG price. This is the main insight
behind Theorem 3, so the proof of that theorem goes through as well. Thus, if the
optimal combination of PAYG price and reserve price for a hybrid system is such
that all classes of jobs participate in PAYG, then the reserve price is equal to the
PAYG price and the system is effectively PAYG alone.
Furthermore, even in ranges of parameters where a hybrid market is superior,
this analysis suggests there is an option that is better than either: offer only
PAYG, but with a menu of prices where lower prices receive a larger (artificial)
delay before (an approach explored by Afe`che [1]). By way of intuition if the menu
of prices and delays are chosen to be the payments and expected waiting time
at the various cutoff values for different classes in the spot market, all jobs of a
class that were making less than their cutoff payment would still be willing to pay
the higher amount rather than balk. Indeed, in the example of Figure 5 where a
hybrid market can raise revenue from 25.0 to 26.6, such a scheme can generate
revenues upwards of 33. Such artificial delays are not without precedent: among
other restrictions the Amazon Glacier cloud storage system may delay responding
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to requests for up to 3 to 5 hours. Further, subsequent to our work Google launched
“Preemptible VMs” which take exactly this approach of offering a fixed discount
for the risk of preemption.
This analysis is in stark contrast to that of Doroudi et al.[8], who found that
a spot market with a reserve price is optimal in their setting (and in particular
superior to PAYG). However, their result relies on PAYG having the same resource
constraints as the spot market does, a feature we have argued is not present in
current cloud systems.
These results are under our Incentive Compatible allocation assumption, which
implies that jobs are able to discover enough information from the system for it
to be optimal to bid truthfully. This implies that any reserve price must be public
knowledge or discoverable. Ben-Yehuda et al. [4] argue that Amazon EC2 spot
prices appears to use a dynamic or random reserve price. Equivalently, this result
could be due to having a limited supply of spot instances that is variable over
time. Such opacity can cause agents (jobs) to be unsure what is their best report,
thus making the mechanism (and pricing) not incentive compatible.
7.3 Spot Market Costs
Another variant of our model would be to assume that participation in the spot
market is costly. In practice, designing systems to backup and resume work from
checkpoints may require additional effort, so being preempted may not actually
be costless the way our basic model assumes. If all classes of jobs must pay the
same cost to participate in the spot market, then this essentially serves as a reserve
price, except that it simply represents a loss of efficiency rather than an increase in
revenue. If the cost is not the same for all classes, the situation is more interesting.
In particular, if the cost is higher for classes with higher values, this opens up
an opportunity to discriminate between classes that can make a hybrid market
clearly profitable. Such “damaged goods” approaches to market segmentation are
common across a variety of markets [17].
Suppose there are only two classes with v1 > v2 and class 1 is required to pay a
cost of s1 to participate in the spot market. Our results are easily adapted to the
general case of indirect spot-market participation costs: for example, in (7) and
in Theorem 1 vi is simply replaced by vi − si. However, now it is not necessarily
the case that c1(p) > c2(p). To see this, take the extreme case of s1 = v1, in which
case jobs of class 1 will not participate in the spot market while jobs of class 2
will still do so. Thus, a high PAYG price could be set to optimally extract revenue
from jobs of class 1, and even if this price is higher than µv2 some revenue would
still be extracted from the jobs of class 2 in the spot market with no jobs of class
1 defecting to it.
As related differentiation occurs when the support of the waiting cost is [si, µvi]
rather than [0, µvi]. Our analysis goes through using obvious alterations to the
lower limits of integrals (equivalently, putting fi(t) = 0 for t ∈ [si, 0]). The quan-
titative behavior is similar to when si is an indirect cost. For example, in the
two-class example, if s1 = vi and s2 = 0 then class 1 jobs will not participate in
the spot market.
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8 Discussion and Future Work
Our analysis characterizes a truthful BNE for the system where PAYG and the
spot market are operating simultaneously. Our theoretical results show that in
many cases the revenue raised by a PAYG system in isolation with a well chosen
price p dominates that of this hybrid system. In particular, we have proved that
this always holds true when all classes participate in the PAYG market. It will
also hold true in the degenerate case, where the PAYG is chosen suboptimally
high, so that all cases prefer to enter the spot market. Simulations suggest that
this may be true in general, regardless of whether individual classes of enter the
PAYG market.
Our results contrast with previous work, and may also appear counterintuitive
to those expecting price discrimination to automatically yield higher revenues.
One significant difference between our work and previous analyses is the com-
bination of two different markets operating simultaneously and under different
mechanisms, one an incentive-compatible mechanism and the other a fixed price
design requiring no information from the users. We specifically chose such a system
as an abstraction of current pricing systems. If there is but a single mechanism for
all users, that is a single scheduling and pricing design, then optimal dynamic or
auction-based pricing can raise move revenue than fixed pricing, a result that has
been proved under a variety of assumptions. The introduction of a secondary mar-
ket changes the picture by changing user incentives. With the combined system,
it is very difficult to extract extra revenue by using a spot market, because of the
difficulty of avoiding cannibalizing the primary market, where low waiting cost,
high value customers choose to drop to the (cheaper) spot market, thus decreasing
revenue. Our results frame this more precisely.
Our analysis is based on a number of assumptions. However, as we have shown,
many of them are not critical for our conclusions to hold. For example, we model
the PAYG system as having infinite capacity, which we believe is reasonable given
that capacity is endogenous and PAYG jobs are more profitable than spot market
jobs. However, this can be relaxed as long as the capacity is “large.” Similarly, our
analysis is robust to the ability to set reserve prices in the spot market.
One assumption that does affect our findings is the assumption that the only
indirect costs to jobs are waiting time, and hence that other indirect costs are
zero, costs such as those associated with preemption or rewriting applications to
enable them to cope with possible preemption. If these additional costs, si, differ
among classes and are non-zero, it need no longer be the case that the cut-offs
ci decrease with (increasing) i. Indeed, si may be sufficiently large to offset the
adverse selection problem, causing instead high value jobs to stay with PAYG so
that the hybrid market extracts more revenue. For example, having both vi and si
decreasing with i but differences vi − si increasing implies high value jobs favour
PAYG while low value favour a spot market.
Lastly, there are three assumptions which merit further study: first, the current
analysis assumes that the arrival process is independent of job type. This may not
be true if both arrival pattern and value depend on underlying characteristics
of the job. An example of this would be if more valuable jobs tend to arrive
at certain times of day. Then it is possible that there are equilibria where jobs of
different classes but the same cost have different outcomes. Though as both classes
have the same set of optimal outcomes, this requires an amount of coordination
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on tiebreaking that may be unreasonable in practice. Secondly, our framework
is for a monopolistic provider. The effect of competitive pressures needs to be
investigated. Third, we have assumed that waiting costs are linear. This does make
the equilibrium analysis dramatically easier because only the expected waiting time
matters rather than the full distribution, but does mean that the waiting cost can
exceed the value of the job, resulting in negative utility.
We conclude by discussing the important point that Amazon does in fact op-
erate a spot market, despite our results suggesting that it may not be optimal
from a revenue perspective to do so. One possibility is that their arrival distri-
bution happens to be in one of the ranges where this is in fact optimal or some
assumption our model makes is not applicable in their setting. However, another
possibility is that it is being used for reasons other than revenue optimality. For
example, even if Amazon is making less money, they may be gaining useful in-
formation about what jobs can easily be interrupted if the system experiences an
unexpected spike in demand or large-scale failure. Alternatively, the lack of rev-
enue optimality may be exactly the point if the spot market is viewed as a way to
gain new customers by offering them lower prices while they are still operating at
a smaller scaler. This is consistent with the observation that, anecdotally, Amazon
makes it difficult to operate in the spot market at a large scale. Finally, based on
the analysis of Ben-Yehuda et al. [4] which found Amazon controls reserve prices
and causes them to spike, Amazon may actually be using something closer to the
menu pricing approach we discuss in Section 7.2. Perhaps tellingly in this regard,
when Amazon introduced Glacier as a less expensive storage service, they adopted
artificial delays rather than a sport market for data access. Thus, we do not view
Amazon’s operation of a spot market as necessarily contradicting our model or
results.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We begin with a technical lemma that will be used several times in the appendix.
Lemma 7 Let (x1, . . . , xk and gi(xi), . . . , gn(xn) be given such that gj(xj) is weakly in-
creasing and semidifferentiable5 with left derivative at most 1/µ. Then there exists unique
xi, . . . , xn such that
x = (x1, . . . , xk, xi, . . . , xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)
satisfies ∫ xi
0
w(t;x)dt = gi(xi) (18)
for all j ≥ i.
Proof Suppose this holds for i + 1 to prove that it holds for i. By our induction hypothesis,
given any z ∈ [0, µvi], there is a unique
x(z) = (x1, . . . , xk, z, . . . , z, xi+1, . . . , xn)
satisfying
∫ xj
0 w(t;x(z))dt = gj(xj) for all j ≥ i+ 1. Next we show that φ(z) ,
∫ z
0 w(t;x(z))dt
is strictly increasing in z for z ∈ [0, µvi]. Since
∫ xi+2
0 w(t;x(z))dt is increasing in each xj ,
5 A function is semidifferentiable if it has left and right derivatives but they need not be
equal. Note that this implies continuity. An example relevant for Theorem 2 is a continuous
piecewise linear function.
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xi+2(z) is decreasing in z. Consider ẑ > z. Then, [xi+2(z), z] ⊂ [xi+2(ẑ), ẑ], and∫ ẑ
0
w(t;x(ẑ))dt−
∫ z
0
w(t;x(z))dt
=
∫ ẑ
xi+2(ẑ)
w(t;x(ẑ))dt−
∫ z
xi+2(z)
w(t;x(z))dt
=
∫
t∈[xi+2(ẑ),ẑ]\[xi+2(z),z]
w(t;x(ẑ))dt
+
∫ z
xi+2(z)
(w(t;x(ẑ))− w(t;x(z))) dt
>
∫ z
xi+2(z)
(w(t;x(ẑ))− w(t;x(z))) dt > 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4. Hence, φ(z) is increasing.
Since φ(0) = 0 ≤ gi(0), φ(µvi) ≥ vi ≥ gi(µvi), φ(z) is differentiable with φ′(z) > 1/µ,
and gi is weakly increasing and semidifferentiable with left derivative at most 1/mu, there is
a unique z solving φ(z) = vi+1. This establishes the claim.
Applying the lemma immediately gives the first part of the theorem. We complete the
proof by establish the second part of the theorem.
Given cS , the expected payoff of a job from class i with waiting cost c ≤ cSi from partic-
ipating in the spot market is vi −
∫ c
0 w(t; c
S)dt. Since cS satisfies (7), the expected payoff is
nonnegative. The pricing rule (4) ensures incentive compatibility for c ≤ cSi . We only need to
show that if c > cSi , the job does not participates in the spot market. Since w(t; c
S) = 1/µ for
t ≥ cS1 , reporting a waiting cost larger than cS1 does not improve the waiting time of the job,
and the expected payment is at least m(cS1 ). Hence, if a job with waiting cost c > c
S
i decides
to participate in the spot market, it will (mis)report a waiting cost ĉ ∈ [0, cS1 ]. The expected
payoff of the job is vi − cw(ĉ; cS)−m(ĉ). Then,
vi − cw(ĉ; cS)−m(ĉ)
= vi − cSi w(ĉ; cS)−m(ĉ)− (c− cSi )w(ĉ; cS),
≤ vi − cSi w(cSi ; cS)−m(cSi )− (c− cSi )w(ĉ; cS),
= −(c− cSi )w(ĉ; cS < 0.
The first inequality is from the IC constraint (3) and then last equality is because the cutoffs
cS are the solutions of (18). Hence the expected payoff of a job with waiting cost c > ci from
participating in the spot market is negative and it will not participate.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
B Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1: Existence of the unique solution c
The existence and uniqueness of ci follows from Lemma 7.
Step 2: Existence of unique i
In equilibrium, jobs of class j whose waiting cost is cj(p) are indifferent between partici-
pating in the spot market and some outside option, either PAYG or balking. That is,
vj −
∫ cj(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt = max
(
0, vj − p+ cj(p)
µ
)
,
or ∫ cj(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt = min
(
vj ,
p+ cj(p)
µ
)
.
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The existence and uniqueness of such a c(p) follows from Lemma 7. Given this solution,
there is either a unique c∗ such that
∫ c∗
0
w(t; c(p))dt =
p+ c∗
µ
,
or ∫ µv1
0
w(t; c(p))dt <
p+ µv1
µ
.
In the latter case, no job participates in PAYG so we are done. In the former, there is a unique
i such that
vi+1 ≤ p+ c
∗
µ
< vi,
or
p ∈ [µvi+1 − c∗, µvi − c∗).
By construction, c∗ ≥ cj for j > i and c∗ ≤ cj for j ≤ i. Thus there is a unique such i as
desired.
Step 3: Existence of the solution to the equations governing the choice of c(p).
Our argument in the previous step shows that the c(p) we construct is a solution to (11).
By Lemma 7 it is the unique solution.
Step 4: Characterizing equilibrium.
To be an equilibrium, the cutoff vector c(p) must satisfy the following constraints for all
c < cj(p):
vj −
∫ c
0 w(t; c(p))dt ≥ 0 and
vj −
∫ c
0 w(t; c(p))dt > vj − p+cµ .
(19)
Hence either,
{
vj −
∫ cj(p)
0 w(t; c(p))dt = 0,
vj − p+cµ < 0 for c ∈ [cj(p), µvj − p],
or,

vj −
∫ cj(p)
0 w(t; c(p))dt = vj −
p+cj(p)
µ
,
vj − p+cµ ≥ vj −
∫ ci(p)
0 w(t; c(p))dt and
vj − p+cµ ≥ 0 for c ∈ [cj(p), µvj − p].
(20)
Constraint (19) says that the jobs with waiting cost below the cutoff get nonnegative expected
payoff from participating in the spot market. Moreover, this expected payoff is strictly higher
than that from participating in PAYG. Constraint (20) says that either no jobs from a class i
participate in PAYG, or jobs split between the spot market and PAYG with those above the
cutoff weakly preferring PAYG.
First, consider classes j ≥ i. For these classes, ∫ ci(p)0 w(t; c(p))dt = vi, so by construction
the first inequality of (19) is satisfied. For the second, p+c
µ
− ∫ c0 w(t; c(p))dt is decreasing in c
for c < c1(p), where it reaches 0. Therefore the second inequality is satisfied. For (20), these
classes satisfy the first system of constraints. By construction the equality is satisfied, while
the inequality is satisfied because p+c
µ
− ∫ c0 w(t; c(p))dt > 0.
Now consider classes j < i. These classes share the same cutoff c∗ satisfying
∫ c∗
0 w(t; c(p))dt =
p+c∗
µ
. For these classes, vj >
p+cj(p)
µ
> 0, so (19) is satisfied. For (20), these classes satisfy the
second system of constraints. By construction the equality is satisfied, while the first inequality
is satisfied because p+c
µ
− ∫ c0 w(t; c(p))dt is decreasing in c for c < cj(p), where it reaches 0.
The second inequality trivially holds for all c ≤ µvi− p. (This point is part of the intuition for
our results about revenue).
This gives the desired equilibrium characterization. A job from class j < i with waiting
cost c participates in the spot market if and only if c ≤ cj(p); it participates in PAYG if
cj(p) ≤ c ≤ µvj − p. A job from class j ≥ i with waiting cost c participates in the spot market
if and only if c ≤ cj(p); it never participates in PAYG.
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